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Abstract 
Climate change poses a global challenge that calls for solution and urgent actions that need to be formulated in policy making. 
These issues are loaded with ethical implications which arise in policy debates. This paper tries to analyze the ethical issues 
of climate change within the framework of analytic ethics of the western philosophical tradition. This paper attempts to bring 
metaethics and principles of normative ethics within the present context of climate change and thus provide a philosophical 
foundation to the ethical problems relevant to policy debates. We have proposed that the ethics of global climate change be 
considered a subdivision of applied ethics.  
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1. Introduction 
Global Climate Change (henceforth GCC) is a 
matter of serious concern because of the 
consequences that follow from it that affects the human 
species as well as other species across all ecosystems. 
It has also been established that it is human actions in 
pursuit of human interests that has resulted in GCC 
having more devastating impacts on human beings, 
particularly of the poorer nations in the tropics. An 
urgent action is needed by the world community to 
arrest these damages in future and also ameliorate the 
conditions of fellow human beings who are victims of 
these damages. Therefore this brings issues of ethical 
dimension in discussions of policy making. There are 
different aspects of these ethical dimensions that stand 
in need of discussion but they have not been 
addressed at all. The Buenos Aires draft declaration 
(2004) (henceforth BDD) on the ethical dimensions of 
climate change makes clear that there is a large 
amount of scientific and economic literature on climate 
change but the ethical dimensions of climate change 
have not been sufficiently addressed. Stephen 
Gardiner in his survey article draws upon the 
authoritative Intergovernmental Panel on Climate 
Change (IPCC) report of 2001 and says that climate 
change is essentially an ethical issue and then goes on 
to question why there has been a neglect on the part of 
moral philosophers to take climate change seriously 
(2004, p. 555-556). Dale Jamieson contends that the 
problems of climate change are essentially problems of 
ethics and politics (1992, p.149). Gardiner’s 
explanation for this neglect on the part of moral 
philosophers is that the interdisciplinary nature of the  
 
subject crossing the boundaries of science, economics, 
law and international relations creates an obstacle to 
philosophical work. Though this may be true partly (it is 
not our intention here to debate on this issue) but the 
more important question that needs to be considered is 
how ethics figures in a very significant way in one of 
the nature’s process of change. The purpose of this 
essay   is to consider the issue of GCC within the 
analytical framework of ethics of the western 
philosophical tradition. A person engaged in analytic 
ethics reasons about the ultimate questions of morality. 
Jamieson (1996, p.324) gives an assessment of 
Intentional Climate change drawing upon the western 
tradition. But our purpose in this essay is different from 
that of Jamieson. We propose to embed or locate the 
ethical dimension of climate change within the 
framework of analytic ethics and thus bring analytic 
ethics into the present context of GCC. We would also 
like to state that our proposal is just one of the attempts 
to analyze the ethical dimension of GCC and not to 
claim that this is the only analysis possible but assert 
that this form of analysis does provide a good 
philosophical foundation to the ethical problems of 
GCC relevant for policy making. Considering the fact 
that ethics is a philosophical study of morals, the 
analytical framework of ethics for GCC will focus on the 
following points each of which will be discussed in 
sections 2, 3 and 4. 
 
a) What do we mean when we bring the subject 
of ethics to global climate change? This 
discussion will touch upon metaethics broadly. 
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b) A change brings in certain consequences 
affecting us in different ways like 
environmentally, economically, socially, etc. 
GCC has impact on agriculture, health and 
comfortable settlement. So how should ethics 
be viewed in terms of consequences? How 
do we choose a set of actions that best 
maximizes good consequences? Discussion 
of this point will primarily draw from normative 
ethics.   
 
c) It is imperative to consider that ethics of GCC 
is an applied ethics problem and thus see it 
as a group forming part of applied ethics 
because it analyses moral issues that crop up 
in climate change policies. These issues are, 
as mentioned in the BDD: which humans, 
societies, communities, plants, animals, and 
ecosystems will survive; which persons and 
countries will bear the burden of climate 
change. These are moral issues in terms of 
responsibility, obligation etc. which engender 
controversies.  
   
This will enable us to place the ethical problems of 
GCC on firm philosophical foundations. The moral 
philosophers can very well take their role seriously, the 
neglect of which is a concern for Gardiner mentioned 
above, in pointing to philosophical foundations in the 
ethical debates arising in policy formulations.  
We will not touch upon the anthropocentric 
ecocentric debate which has occupied much attention 
in recent times. We feel that even within the ambit of 
anthropocentric view of ethics we can develop a firm 
philosophical foundation relevant for policy debates. It 
is not our contention that such debates are of not much 
of philosophical interest, but that they call upon a totally 
different metaethics- of emotivism- of the type 
advocated by positivists like A J Ayer and C L 
Stevenson and its philosophical foundations may not 
be of much relevance to policy making.   
2. Ethics, Metaethics and GCC 
The application of ethics to GCC can be viewed 
within a causal background. When we talk of change 
there is change that is being produced in some 
phenomenon and that, in the present context, is the 
climate. For a change to happen there are causal 
factors that operate. The natural phenomenon that 
undergoes change can be caused exclusively due to 
nature. But in other cases there are human actions and 
activities which form part of this causal chain in a 
significant way to effect a change. For example 
earthquakes tsunamis are natural disasters whose 
causal factors are exclusively natural (plate tectonics 
etc...). But global environmental problems and the 
associated climate change are effected where human 
activities are very much part of the causal chain. In fact 
the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate 
Change uses the term in connection with human 
activities as the cause and makes a distinction with the 
term ‘climate variability’ attributable to natural causes. 
The emission of greenhouse gases due to 
industrialization-a human activity – has caused global 
warming. Drawing upon the Third Assessment Report 
of IPCC 2001 Peter Singer says how much of climate 
change is produced by human activity is stated thus: 
“new and stronger evidence that most of the warming 
observed over the last 50 years is attributable to 
human activities” ([2002a] 2004, p.16). Since human 
actions are part of the causal chain, is there any way 
the operation of the causal chain can be blocked, so far 
as activities of human beings are concerned, so that 
the change which takes place can be checked keeping 
the larger interests of the community.  There are two 
issues that need to be addressed when we consider 
human activity as part of a causal chain that has 
caused GCC. They are  
1) the emissions that have already occurred 
putting quite a large section of humanity in a 
precarious survival situation.  
2) the role that is expected to be played by 
different nations in impeding these human 
activities in a bid to control future emissions, 
considering the fact that different nations are 
placed in widely different stages of economic 
development.   
 
In addressing the above two issues we are led to 
the question: what are the options available in terms of 
choice of actions and what are the effects of exercising 
those actions? The nations of the world need to play a 
meaningful role in addressing the above two issues 
and very delicate and controversial concerns will arise 
particularly in discussions of policy making which 
consist in questions like who should do what and why 
should he be doing that. These are precisely ethical 
concerns where one needs to exercise moral 
judgments. This touches upon issues of 
consequentialism in ethics. Our argument is that since 
we have a choice of actions, which choice we need to 
exercise keeping in view the best consequences- a 
consequentialist view- it is very significant to talk about 
ethics of GCC. The question of responsibility which 
very much figures in discussions about climate change 
is also connected with cause. Gardiner brings this 
question of responsibility of past actions in his article. 
We will take up this in sections 2 and 3, when 
discussing about normative ethics.   
 
It is philosophically important to reflect that, when 
we refer to moral judgments above, we need to clarify 
what are these moral judgments of GCC. What are the 
philosophical underpinnings on which our moral actions 
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on the GCC are based? This discussion will marginally 
touch upon questions on metaethics. Metaethics 
concerns itself primarily with the discussion about what 
is morality and on what are moral judgments based. As 
Gensler has stated, morality can be based upon social 
conventions, personal feelings, or God’s will as viewed 
by the common people. But philosophers base morality 
on self-evident truths, emotional exclamations, or 
rational imperatives (Gensler, 1998 p.5). As far as the 
ethics of GCC are concerned we would like to claim 
that it is “rational imperatives” on which moral 
principles regarding climate change are based. Policy 
formulations touching upon ethical dimensions are 
couched in value words. To take simple illustrations to 
make this point clear we make statements like “You 
ought to bring down emissions,” “It is obligatory to 
assist the lesser developed nations for the harm 
caused” etc. We employ here a moral language with 
value words like ‘ought’ ‘obligation’ and the likes of it. 
These value words are making judgments of a moral 
kind and these moral judgments are a prescription or 
an imperative. Drawing upon Gensler’s view on 
prescriptivism, it is very important that the ethical 
theory on which the policy formulations are based 
allows two things i) freedom to form ones belief ii) how 
to be rational in forming ones belief (1998, pp.73-74). 
According to Hare it is through moral language by 
understanding terms like “ought” that we form moral 
beliefs in a free and rational way. Another important 
feature of Hare as noted by Singer (2002b, p.310) is to 
bring reason to play a role in his metaethics. It is these 
aspects of freedom and rationality in metaethics that 
become very important for policy debates. With the 
metaethics of Hare one can reason about morality. It is 
this aspect which the earlier metaethics like emotivism 
lacked1. The “ought” that is captured in moral beliefs 
has logical rules of use based on its meaning which is 
equivalent to “Do this and let everyone do the same”. 
There are certain consistency rules that can be based 
on this meaning which is well captured by Gensler in 
the following way: 
Rule U. To be logically consistent, we must make 
similar evaluations about similar   
               cases. 
Rule P. To be logically consistent, we must keep 
our moral beliefs in harmony with      
              how we live and want others to live. 
These are consistency rules and should not be 
confused with the moral imperatives, which give the 
necessary framework for policy debates touching upon 
ethical issues. However, we need certain other 
                                                        
1 It is in this context we contend that the present ethnocentric view 
which extends morality to other beings rests on the 
metaethical view of emotivism- a view where moral judgments 
are simply a matter of expressing our positive and negative 
feelings and therefore would not be of much relevance in 
policy debates 
components like factual information etc for the 
formation of moral judgments. As Gensler says “To 
think rationally about ethics, we need to be informed, 
imaginative, and consistent.”(1998, p.76) There are 
three key components in taking up this metaethical 
basis. These are the a) the informed component 
reflecting the knowledge aspect b) the imaginative 
component and c) the consistency component to 
evaluate the consistency in our action under similar 
situations. The reason why ‘rational imperatives’ 
metaethical approach is adopted is ‘we need to know 
the effect of actions on the lives of others”. As 
mentioned above in exercising the choice of actions we 
need to know the consequences of those actions on 
GCC. That there is sufficient informed component in 
the form of expertise documentation is mentioned by 
Singer ([2002a] 2004, p.16). Then we need to place 
ourselves in other person’s situation at the receiving 
end of the action and this is the imaginative component. 
The actions one takes are evaluated in terms of 
consistency one maintains in desiring that the same 
kind of act in all similar cases. Sometimes 
inconsistencies get revealed in our policy making. 
Kristin Shrader-Frechete brings this point while 
remarking on the analysis of ‘value systems 
undergirding policies relevant to human and 
environmental well-being.’ “Such analysis would reveal 
that we often pay lip service to ethical values, such as 
equal opportunity, but follow policies that logically 
presuppose denial of those same values, or that we 
laud particular ethical goals but sanction decisions that 
preclude achievement of those goals” ([1985] 1991, 
pp.97-98) The consistency condition often called the 
golden rule should very much be a part of the policy 
making activity not as an imperative but as rules of 
ethical debate. How these components are relevant for 
the metaethics of GCC will be discussed in section 4. 
3. Normative ethics of GCC 
 That morality is based on rational imperative is a 
plausible metaethical basis provides a method to arrive 
at what moral principles we ought to have for global 
climate change. We human beings have evolved due 
to certain environmental conditions prevailing but now 
our very actions are threatening to upset global 
environments. In such a situation various questions 
bearing on moral dimensions crop up. How are we to 
live along with nature? What should be our relationship 
with it? What are our obligations towards nature and 
other human societies having an intimate relationship 
with nature?   This is a domain of normative ethics and 
there are two basic approaches. They are a) 
Consequentialism and b) Nonconsequentialism. 
Consequentialism propounds that our action should be 
such as to maximize good consequences but non 
consequentialism propounds that there is something 
intrinsic in the action itself that makes it right or wrong 
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and not because they have bad consequences.2 In the 
context of GCC it is consequentialism that we take as 
the basic approach about principles of ethical action. 
The choice of action that we exercise has certain 
consequences and policy making reflects the actions 
that one undertakes. As policy prescriptions are well 
thought out action plans, it therefore, becomes very 
important that the environment in which policy thinking 
is conducted is ethically enriched. This is what 
Shrader- Frechette terms it as conceptual environment 
([1985] 1991, p.97) where ethics or moral philosophy 
plays a major role. But in this we have to take a rather 
broader consequentialist approach and not the popular 
consequentialism of the utilitarian kind. The popular 
utilitarian kind focuses on the balance of pleasure over 
pain. The basic tenet of classical utilitarianism runs as 
follows: “We ought to do whatever maximizes the 
balance of pleasure over pain for everyone affected by 
our action” (Gensler 1998, p.140). The pleasure of 
hunting of blackbucks or tigers may overweigh the pain 
caused to these animals and therefore they may lead 
to the extinction of the species. To avoid these kinds of 
situations, the consequentialism of the utilitarian kind is 
to be eschewed. 3  The basic problem here is with 
equating utility to pleasure which just indicates a kind 
of crass hedonism or physical pleasures. In the context 
of climate change the utility has a different connotation 
which to a great extent has been quantified in terms of 
standards of sustenance. In the principle of general 
utilitarianism (GU) one is to ask “what would happen if 
everyone were to do so and so in such cases?” This 
fits in with the metaethics that we have adopted in this 
context (consistency condition). Enough data is 
available on this to answer this question. The impact of 
climate change on dry land agriculture (rain fed 
agriculture in both semi arid and arid tropics) human 
health etc is well documented. We propose that 
principle of utility as part of the normative ethics for 
GCC considering the fact that agriculture, human 
health and conduciveness of settlements are all utilities 
for human beings. But at the same time the principle of 
utility cannot be the sole standard for moral action in 
the context of climate change. The responsibility of 
past actions which has caused significant damage to 
the climate affecting sections of a human race–both 
intergenerational and intragenerational- has occupied 
the attention of policy makers. Drawing upon IPCC, 
1995 with regard to costs imposed due to emissions, 
Gardiner points that the developed countries are more 
responsible for historical emissions. Therefore in 
                                                        
2 Moral judgments based on intrinsic value of an action will rest on 
the metaethics of emotivism 
3 Of course we can still argue within this approach that the pleasure 
of preserving the blackbuck or tiger will exceed the pleasure of 
hunting keeping the larger community in mind. But this is a 
fact dependent on the specific situation where this may not be 
the case. Therefore better to avoid this approach.  
addition to principle of utility we contend that another 
principle that guides the distribution of good and evil is 
very much a part of normative ethics of global change. 
This is the principle of justice. This principle becomes 
important in the context of cost sharing of global 
greenhouse gas emissions. On the issue of allocating 
costs of greenhouse gas emissions, Gardiner notes 
that there is surprising convergence among 
philosophical writers. In his footnote (2004, p.580), he 
says that philosophers like Singer account for this 
convergence because of the traditional lines of thought 
about justice. We will again come up with this issue 
when dealing with the principle of normative ethics that 
we need to appeal to, in the next section. 
4. GCC – An applied ethics issue 
We further propose that ethics of climate change 
be accorded the separate status of a subdivision of 
applied ethics. This is because there are certain moral 
issues on climate change and these are controversial 
issues which are being debated in policy making. We 
here again draw upon the BDD where the urgency of 
ethical dimensions to policy making is voiced for the 
following reasons 
1. The possibility of the international community 
to respond in ethically unjust and 
unsupportable ways in the absence of ethical 
dimensions 
2. Policy proposals containing scientific and 
economic arguments hide ethical questions 
3. There are certain barriers that are blocking 
the progress of international negotiations. We 
need an equitable approach to overcome 
these barriers. 
4. The rich poor gap can be prevented from 
further widening if an ethically based global 
consensus is worked out. Our earth is 
endowed with a limited capacity to absorb 
greenhouse gas emissions. Therefore 
considering it as a common resource or sink, 
we need to work out an equitable use of the 
same.    
 
Further the draft also points to an issue that has 
impact on the discussions on the ethical dimension of 
climate change. This is the issue concerning human 
activities in one part of the world affecting other people 
who are far removed in space and (also time) to bear 
the disastrous consequences of ecosystem damage. 
Jamieson (1992, p.149)) mentions that the causes in 
such cases become diffuse. The BDD remarks that the 
developed world should bear a fair share of such 
responsibility. But Jamieson feels that in such kind of 
situations, since the causes are diffuse, it is very 
difficult to hold anyone responsible within the 
conventional framework of ethics and, therefore, 
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advocates a paradigm shift in values and conceptions 
of responsibility in the case of human-induced GCC.  
It is our contention that the ‘rational imperative’ 
metaethics with its consistency condition would be the 
basis of the ethical dimension touching upon the above 
issues of the BDD. What are the normative principles 
that we can appeal to in the ethical discussions of GCC?  
First we would like to deal with the importance of 
“rational imperative’ as a metaethical basis. We have 
an extensive documentation about the impact of the 
human activities in the GCC both across geographical 
distance and its spread in future. Given such a vast 
scientific study it is difficult to accept Jamieson’s 
contention that the causes of destruction are diffuse. 
The diffusivity may perhaps rise for Jamieson because 
we are not able to point out to an individual in a crime, 
an example he takes in his essay (1992, p.148). But 
that is no cause of worry. We can also hold a 
community or a nation or any other group for this 
irresponsible behavior. Inability to hold an individual 
responsible is no case for the diffusivity. There is quite 
a good amount of informed component- one of the 
components of metaethics - that is available. Also, it is 
easy to imagine ourselves to be in the situation of 
hostile global environment. It is a hypothetical situation. 
And if we are consistent in our behavior, we would not 
desire to be in that situation. There is one issue that 
comes up with informed component particularly with 
regard to historical emissions pointed out above in 
section 2. The argument runs as follows. It is accepted 
that developed countries have caused much of 
damage to the climate due to large emissions. But till 
recently they were not aware of the effects of their 
emissions and since the act was committed out of 
ignorance, they should not be held responsible. We 
would like to respond to this argument in two ways. 
The consistency condition can apply where the same 
nations, who have ignorantly damaged the 
environment, can be thought to be at the receiving end 
of the action. They would definitely have desired not to 
be in such a severe condition. Given that because of 
their actions they have enriched themselves and have 
also inflicted a severe crisis on the poorer nations, the 
consistency condition will impel them to bear an 
obligation towards these poorer nations. The issue of 
historical emission will again come up in the context of 
deciding on the normative principles to which we can 
appeal in the context of GCC.      
We now take up the normative principles that 
should be applied to the ethics of GCC. As mentioned 
in section 3, we propose that the principle of general 
utility and the principle of justice are to be appealed to. 
We claim that with these principles the clarity of ethical 
dimensions to GCC can be gained. It is important to 
the principle of GU to ask “what would happen if 
everyone were to do so and so in such cases?” rather 
than “what would happen if I do so and so in this 
case?” What would happen to utilities like agriculture 
health and conduciveness of settlement if everyone 
were to adopt the same kind of activity? The diffusivity 
of cause which Jamieson speaks of will also not be a 
problem in such cases. He says “Instead of a single 
cause, millions of people will have made tiny, almost 
imperceptible causal contributions- by driving cars, 
cutting trees, using electricity and so on. Many small 
people doing small things over a long period of time 
together will cause unimaginable harms” (1992, p.149). 
Further down he says “ I cannot hope to say what new 
values are needed or to provide a recipe for how to 
bring them about…We can each reason: Since my 
contribution is small, outcomes are likely to be 
determined by the behavior of others. Reasoning in this 
way we can each justify driving cars while advocating 
bicycles or using fireplaces while favoring regulations 
against them.”(1992, p.150) But by appealing to the 
normative principle of GU such reasoning will not hold 
good because GU reasons in terms of the summation 
of everyone’s activities in such similar cases. This 
appeal to the normative principle of GU also does not 
require that we have to look for new system of values 
that requires a paradigm shift as suggested by 
Jamieson. The ethical dimensions of human activity as 
far as GCC is concerned can be bound by this 
normative principle which is quite strong enough and 
this binding is important in the policy framework to 
ensure that international community does not resort to 
unjust and unsupportable ways – a concern of the BDD 
mentioned above in point (1). 
We have also mentioned that this principle needs 
to be complemented by the principle of justice. Here 
we can turn to points (3) and (4) of BDD mentioned 
above. The former points to a need for an equitable 
approach to climate change policy in international 
negotiations. What is the basis of this on which this 
equitable approach is grounded? In other words what 
is the principle of normative ethics that we can appeal 
to for this approach? We propose that it is the principle 
of justice which calls upon the distribution of good or 
bad (harm) not in any arbitrary manner. When two or 
more similar individuals or groups are in similar 
circumstances, but are meted out with different 
treatments, the principle of justice would then be said 
to have been violated. What is the similar circumstance 
of the all the individuals or the different groups or 
nations of the world as far as climate is concerned? It 
can be said that the global atmosphere as a common 
resource with limited capacity within which we are 
embedded gives a commonness in our circumstances. 
We are similar individuals or a group in so far as 
sharing this common resource is concerned. This 
principle then becomes all the more important in policy 
making particularly with regard to the costs to be 
allocated for the use of the this common resource. On 
grounds that we are all similar, this normative principle 
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dictates that the costs should be borne equally. But 
there is a problem as the current situation stands. The 
developed countries in their process of development 
have already consumed more than the fair share of this 
common resource and have thus reached a very high 
level of economic development leaving the poorer 
nations far behind. Therefore, in terms of development, 
all the nations cannot be considered similar. The policy 
making body therefore can establish that there is some 
relevant dissimilarity in these different nations. The 
dissimilarity lies in the levels of development which 
these nations have achieved. This dissimilarity is 
relevant because the global atmospheric resource 
sharing has been skewed in favor of developed nations 
and is one of the factors that have made them reach 
this level of development. It is this dissimilarity that 
gives rise to the question of justice. Gardiner draws 
upon Singer and remarks that the question of justice 
arises in the use of the common atmospheric resource 
which is limited in its capacity. He does not press into 
service the details of the argument that calls into 
question the principle of justice. We have 
demonstrated that by pressing the dissimilarity position 
of different nations, how the question of justice rises. 
He further continues “on this approach, the obvious 
argument to be made is that the developed countries 
have largely exhausted the capacity in the process of 
industrializing and so have, in effect, denied other 
countries the opportunity to use their shares. On this 
view justice seems to require that the developed 
countries compensate the less developed countries for 
this overuse.” The obviousness of argument which 
Gardiner points out can be read differently by the 
developed nations. They can construe it as a crime 
which they have perpetrated for which an indemnity is 
being extracted or a punishment is being meted out 
similar to one Germany was forced to pay for economic 
reparations by signing the Treaty of Versailles after the 
World War I. This is the normative principle of 
retributive justice that is being appealed to that holds 
some one responsible for a wrong doing and applies 
sanctions for that. The obviousness that Gardiner’s 
argument and his view of justice ‘seeming to require’ 
that developed countries compensate appears to have 
such a normative principle of retributive justice in the 
background. This creates conflict and disagreements in 
policy making if a semblance of such a normative 
principle is given. That this is the case is reflected in 
the US presidential debate in 2000 between Bush and 
Al Gore, where referring to the Kyoto Treaty Bush 
strongly pointed out that US would not carry the burden 
for cleaning up the world’s air. Gore also remarks on 
the wording of Kyoto Treaty which says that the 
developing nations feel that developed nations should 
bear the brunt of responsibility for historical emissions. 
Further the response of the developed countries, if the 
principle of retributive justice gets reflected in policy 
proposals, can also extend to justifications being 
offered by them of their being not accountable to past 
emissions due to their ignorance about the effects of 
their emissions. The principle of retributive justice is 
applicable only when an act is done intentionally and 
with complete knowledge. Therefore if this principle is 
appealed to in a form that gets reflected in policy 
making, one can respond to it, as the developed 
countries have done, by appealing to ignorance of the 
act at a particular point in time in the past when the act 
was done.4 The upshot of this argument is to show that 
a normative principle like retributive justice that gets 
reflected in policy proposals will create dissensions and 
disagreements and this normative principle is better 
eschewed.    
As has been mentioned in section 2, Gardiner 
notes that developed countries are responsible for 
much of past emissions. Within the normative principle 
of distributive justice this responsibility is to be 
interpreted in terms of excess use of a limited resource 
of earth’s capacity, albeit ignorantly by developed 
nations. This act, although done out of ignorance, has 
infringed upon the rights of the poorer nations by 
depriving them of their share of the common resource. 
We need to have here a broader understanding of the 
principle of justice. It has to be admitted that the broad 
understanding of the principle of distributive justice also 
acknowledges a) the rights of others to a claim and b) 
for the fair distribution of good and evil. The former 
entails the rights of the poorer nations to a fair share of 
the environment resources of which they have been 
deprived. It is this right of the poorer nations that holds 
against the claim of the developed nations. We can 
reason out that corresponding to this type of right 
which the poorer nations have, there is a necessary 
duty that attaches to the developed nations. The idea 
of a right of someone accompanied by someone else 
having a necessary duty is captured by the expression 
correlative duties. The notion of correlative duties 
becomes very important in the present context 
because it has a role to play in identifying who the duty 
holder is, the identification of which Jamieson (1992, 
p.150) says is impossible to make in cases such as 
climate damage. He illustrates with an example how 
the current value system fixes responsibility based on 
locality of space and time as follows. A particular 
person, Jones, breaks into the house of another 
particular person Smith, and steals all the valuables. 
The individual Smith having lost the valuables suffers 
harm. It is clear in this case that Jones is responsible 
for the harm caused to Smith. This violation of norms 
attracts punishment to Jones or requires him to 
compensate Smith for the damages or harm caused by 
him (Jones). It is Jamieson’s contention that we cannot 
                                                        
4 Peter Singer indicates a similar response that could be made on 
behalf of developed nations ([2002a] 2004 p.34). 
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apply this paradigm of current value system to global 
environmental problems.  He writes “There is no one 
whom we can identify as the cause of destruction in the 
way in which we can identify Jones as the cause of 
Smith’s loss” and he continues “Despite the fact that 
serious, clearly identifiable harms will have occurred 
because of human agency, conventional morality 
would have trouble finding anyone to blame.” (1992, 
p.149) We circumvent this problem by avoiding appeal 
to principles of retributive justice but adopting the 
principle of distributive justice.5 The claim of the poorer 
nations for the fair share of the common atmospheric 
resource is a strong claim under the principle of 
distributive justice. The notion of correlative duties 
makes it possible to identify a duty holder to allow for 
this strong claim. The duty holders in the present 
context of GCC are the developed nations. Apart from 
depriving the poorer nations of their fair share of the 
earth’s atmospheric resource the past emissions have 
also caused terrible damage and hardship to their 
survival. This brings us to the part (b) of the principle of 
distributive justice i.e. the fair distribution of good and 
evil. The evil which the poorer nations have to face in 
the form of damages to agriculture, health etc., and 
thus affecting their survival, is also skewed against 
them. Therefore, they have a right to extricate 
themselves out from the damages that have affected 
them and this right again enforces the correlative 
duties on the developed nations and identifies them as 
a duty holder. These arguments have implications 
again for policy making as it must clearly spell out who 
has to do by what means to the poorer nation’s right 
claims that the principle of justice recognizes. One can 
then, based on this argument, incorporate a 
compensation action plan in the policy proposals.  
At this point certain other intricate issues crop up. 
Since 1990 the damages caused by human activities 
like industrialization and land use change have been 
made known to all and has gained awareness. But in 
spite of this the damage continues to be inflicted by 
both developed and developing countries in pursuit of 
economic development and the developed countries 
still take the major share of the atmospheric sink 
However, as the situation stands today it is predicted 
that the rate of growth of carbon emissions from 
developing countries (particularly China and India) 
would be more (Raupach et al. 2007, p. 24). In such a 
situation one cannot avoid the principle of retributive 
justice as the ignorance claim does not hold anymore 
and shared responsibilities between different nations at 
different stages of development become fine grained. 
The developing countries have a claim for further 
                                                        
5  In the illustration given by Jamieson the principle of retributive 
justice is applicable as the perpetrator of the act of stealing, 
Jones, is having a complete knowledge of the situation and 
also the fact that he is causing harm to Smith. There is an 
element of intention in his act of causing harm. 
developing their economies which would result in 
carbon emissions. Since they did not get a fair share of 
global atmospheric resource, the correlative duties 
demand that compensation in terms of bearing 
subsidies for clean technology and practices be borne 
by developed countries. On the other hand data 
indicates that land use change from the developing 
countries is also contributing to more carbon emission. 
But this land use change is caused due to population 
growth. Therefore the developing countries also have a 
fair share of responsibility in checking their population. 
These intricate issues have to be clearly articulated in 
the policy debates with the necessary pros and cons 
and the needed mechanisms to implement the policy 
within the above argued framework of ethics.     
 In this section we have shown that certain issues 
of policy making are controversial and intricate 
considering the fact that clash of interests of different 
nations come into play and all these issues have an 
ethical dimension to it. We have also shown the 
metaethics and normative ethics principles that arise in 
such situations and how it can be argued for. It 
therefore becomes important to consider the ethics of 
GCC as a subdivision of applied ethics.    
5. Summary and Conclusion 
Discussions on GCC have significant ethical 
dimension and often such moral issues become 
controversial issues and therefore we cannot make 
much headway in such debates. In this essay an 
attempt has been made to offer a philosophical 
analysis of the ethics of GCC and provide a 
philosophical underpinning relevant to policy debates 
on GCC. In this we have adopted the western analytic 
framework of ethics. We have argued for a metaethics 
of ‘rational imperative’ drawing from R M Hare and 
appealed to the normative principle of GU and 
distributive justice which we claim to be appropriate in 
policy debates. In section 4 we have discussed policy 
making issues having implication for immediate action 
with respect to GCC. But these issues have brought 
certain moral issues to the fore, which have been 
controversial. Therefore, as BDD has made clear, an 
urgent reflection on ethical dimensions is called for. As 
the issues concerned were moral and also 
controversial, we strongly propose that the ethics of 
GCC be a subdivision of applied ethics and have also 
argued for the philosophical underpinning in terms of 
metaethics and normative ethics to deal with these 
controversial moral issues. We strongly feel and 
conclude that in the context of GCC it is possible to 
come out with the choices of action within the 
framework of above analysis.    
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